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DE-NATURALIZING CRIMINAL LAW: OF PUBLIC
PERCEPTIONS AND PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS
Benjamin Levin*
Innocence, it turns out, is a complex concept. Yet the
Innocence Movement has drawn power from the simplicity
of the wrong-person story of innocence, as told most
effectively by the DNA cases. The purity of that story
continues to have power, but that story alone cannot
sustain the Innocence Movement. It is too narrow. It fails
to accommodate the vast majority of innocent people in
our justice system. It fails to embrace innocence in its full
complexity. . . . [I]n the end, for virtually all purposes,
innocence must be understood under the objective rules
that have long governed the criminal justice system....
Without proof of guilt determined by a court, the
presumption of innocence defines innocence.'
I. INTRODUCTION
"The American people are tired of watching hoodlums walk,"
declared President George H.W. Bush, in a radio address before the
1992 presidential election. 2 The people are disgusted, he claimed,
with "seeing criminals mock our justice system with endless
technicalities." 3 The message of a nation enraged by excessive
leniency and sharply aware of the threat posed by criminal
elements was compelling for many listeners and voters. Not only
had this theme been forged over the course of a decades-long war on
crime that had progressively ratcheted up the rhetorical ferocity of
* J.D. Harvard Law School, 2011; B.A. Yale University, 2007. Thanks to the members of
the Albany Law Review for their excellent editorial assistance. All errors, omissions, and
opinions remain mine alone.
I Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALB. L. REv. 1157, 1207-08 (2011).
2 George H. W. Bush, Radio Address to the Nation on the Administration's Domestic
Agenda (June 22, 1991), in 1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES:




attacks on criminality as a major foe of modern society,4 but it had
also been a primary component of President Bush's successful
campaign three years earlier.5
In the months leading up to the 1988 presidential election, then
Vice President Bush, his strategists, and supporters focused on the
crime issue, eventually using it to overpower the Democratic
challenger, Governor Michael Dukakis.6 While he was governor of
Massachusetts, Dukakis had defended the practice of furloughing
inmates-even those convicted of violent felonies.7 During one of
these furloughs, Willie Horton, a convicted murderer broke into the
suburban home of a young couple, attacked the man, and raped the
woman.8 Republican strategists, the Bush campaign team, and
Dukakis's opponents hammered the candidate on the Horton story,
branding him as "soft on crime" and presenting the election's choice
as being between law and order on the one hand and outrageous
lenience on the other. 9 Perhaps most notably, this distinction was
highlighted in a television advertisement that presented the two
candidates' contrasting views on crime, emphasizing Bush's support
for the death penalty as a counterpoint to Dukakis's support of
"weekend passes" for criminals like Horton, and featured an image
4 See generally SUSAN ESTRICH, GETTING AWAY WITH MURDER: How POLITICS IS
DESTROYING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 65 (1998) ("Today, Democrats outdo themselves
to prove they are just as tough [on crime] as Republicans. . . . No one tells the truth, and the
political dishonesty is distorting and destroying the system."); MICHAEL W. FLAMM, LAW AND
ORDER: STREET CRIME, CIVIL UNREST, AND THE CRISIS OF LIBERALISM IN THE 1960s 51-52
(2005) ("In political terms, [the war on crime] was a liberal attempt to neutralize or capture
the conservative issue of law and order."); BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE
MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER 134, 203-08 (2011) ("There is a
lengthy track record . . . of presidential and gubernatorial campaigns that explicitly exploit
the neoliberal combination of free-market ideology and tough-on-crime politics . . . .");
JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 279 (2007) (examining the
consequences of the war on crime).
6 DAVID C. ANDERSON, CRIME AND THE POLITICS OF HYSTERIA: HOW THE WILLIE HORTON
STORY CHANGED AMERICAN JUSTICE 3 (1995); ESTRICH, supra note 4, at 65-66; FLAMM, supra
note 4, at 182-83.
6 See ESTRICH, supra note 4, at 65-66; FLAMM, supra note 4, at 182-83; Editorial, George
Bush and Willie Horton, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1988, at A34 [hereinafter George Bush and
Willie Horton].
7 ESTRICH, supra note 4, at 65-66; FLAMM, supra note 4, at 182.
8 ESTRICH, supra note 4, at 65; FLAMM, supra note 4, at 182.
9 See, e.g., ESTRICH, supra note 4, at 65-66, 71; FLAMM, supra note 4, at 182-83; Gerald G.
Ashdown, Distorting Democracy: Campaign Lies in the 21st Century, 20 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 1085, 1093 n.52 (2001) (citing The :30 Second Candidate, Historical Timeline, PBS
(2001), http://www.pbs.org/30secondcandidate/timeline/years/1988.html); George Bush and
Willie Horton, supra note 6; David Lauter, Crime Issue Becoming Election Battleground, L.A.
TIMES, June 13, 1988, at 1.
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of Horton, glaring, bearded, and disheveled.10
Bush won the election convincingly," and the public humiliation
of Dukakis helped to solidify-at least according to conventional
wisdom-the unviability of running a national campaign that was
not "tough on crime." The years that followed saw a shift, with
Democratic presidential candidates moving away from skeptical
attitudes towards police and policing; for example, Bill Clinton and
Barack Obama emphasized their support for the death penalty
while shying away from the sort of rehabilitationist model that had
defined post-1960s liberalism.12 Indeed, by the time the 2012
election rolled around, crime had ceased to be a major issue-not
necessarily because the streets of U.S. cities were safer, but because
both major political parties had at least ostensibly achieved a
consensus on the importance of criminal law enforcement and harsh
criminal punishment. 13
This is not an essay about Willie Horton or the 1988 presidential
election. The story of the rise of "law and order" politics in the
latter half of the twentieth century is one that has been told
compellingly by historians, criminologists, political scientists, and
legal scholars.14 The transition from the socio-political climate in
which Barry Goldwater's call to arms against urban criminality and
"soft-on-crime" policies 15 to the contemporary one, in which few
10 Willie Horton 1988 Attack Ad, YouTUBE (Nov. 3, 2008),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-Io9KMSSEZOY.
11 See FLAMM, supra note 4, at 183; see also E.J. Dionne Jr., Bush is Elected by a 6-5
Margin with Solid G.O.P. Base in South; Democrats Hold Both Houses, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9,
1988, at Al (reporting George Bush's solid win over democratic opponent Michael Dukakis in
the 1988 presidential election).
12 See, e.g., Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 17 (2011);
Linda Greenhouse, Justices Bar Death Penalty For the Rape of a Child: Execution Ruled Out,
5-4, if Life Isn't Taken, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2008, at Al (quoting President Obama voicing
his objection to a Supreme Court ruling that found the execution of child rapists
unconstitutional); Michael Kramer, The Political Interest: Frying Them Isn't the Answer,
TIME, Mar. 14, 1994, at 32 (quoting President Clinton saying "I can be nicked on a lot. . . but
no one can say I'm soft on crime." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
13 See Charles Lane, Op-Ed., The Victims of Safer Streets, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2012, at
A15 (arguing that Democrats had embraced Republican criminal justice policies and that this
had led to a safer United States--essentially that Republicans had won the war on crime to a
certain extent but in so doing had eliminated the importance of crime as an election issue).
14 See, e.g., FLAMM, supra note 4, at 1, 179; DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL:
CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY, at vii, xi, 1 (2001); DOUGLAS N.
HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 3, 5 (2008); SIMON, supra
note 4, at 3-4; BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 30-32 (2006);
JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE
BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 3-4 (2003).
15 See generally FLAMM, supra note 4, at 31-50 (describing Goldwater's position that 'law
and order [was to become] an important part of national political discourse").
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major-party politicians speak out against mass incarceration or
injustices in the criminal justice system,16 however, serves as a
fitting point of departure.
In the decades following the highly-publicized crime waves of the
late 1960s, the politics of law and order have taken on a critical role
in American social, cultural, and legal discourse.' 7 Particularly in
the wake of the 1988 presidential election, U.S. criminal policies
have grown progressively stricter, embracing a culture of mass
incarceration and increasing police powers.18  Key to these
developments, I argue, is the same concern that animates this
issue-the fear that the guilty will go free, that the procedural
protections implemented by the Warren Court, or the socio-legal
preoccupation with rehabilitation or root causes of crime will
hamstring prosecutions, preventing justice from being meted out
and ultimately jeopardizing public safety.
In this essay, I examine this fundamental concern and challenge
the rhetorical trope of the guilty going free by emphasizing the
institutional and political intricacies that comprise the criminal
justice system and necessarily undergird a determination of "guilt."
My goal, at its essence, is to de-naturalize the criminal law and
discussions of the criminal justice system in the context of this book.
I aim to emphasize that a guilty verdict is the result of a series of
(politically-inflected) decisions about how to draft criminal statutes,
how to structure a trial, and how to select a jury. De-naturalizing
criminal law is, of course, a massive project and is in many ways at
the core of much work being done by criminologists and others
approaching criminal law from interdisciplinary perspectives,19 not
16 See generally id. at 179, 182-83 (describing the "decline of law and order in presidential
races after 1968"); cf. also Sen. Barry M. Goldwater, Editorial, Liberals and Their Issues, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 1970, at § G-7 (criticizing democrats for their inaction regarding the
increasing crime rate in the United States).
17 See FLAMM, supra note 4, at 182 (noting that law and order was "frequently and
successfully" implemented with candidates at the local and state levels during the decades
subsequent to the 1960s); see also SIMON, supra note 4, at 7-10 (explaining the effects of
governing through crime and the impact it has had on governmental aspects, lawmaking, the
courts system, families, schools, and workplaces).
1s See FLAMM, supra note 4, at 183 (recapping the return of law and order during and
subsequent to the 1988 election campaign); see also HUSAK, supra note 14, at 3 (asserting that
there has been a "dramatic expansion in the substantive criminal law and [an] extraordinary
rise in the use of punishment" in recent years); WESTERN, supra note 14, at 30 (describing the
"growth in imprisonment [that] has been sustained over the [past] three decades"); WHITMAN,
supra note 14, at 3-4 (describing increases in U.S. incarceration).
19 See, e.g., STEVEN BOX, POWER, CRIME, AND MYSTIFICATION 1-15 (1983); MICHEL
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 80-81 (Alan Sheridan trans.,
1977); HARCOURT, supra note 4, at 202-08; JOHN LEA & JOCK YOUNG, WHAT IS TO BE DONE
ABOUT LAW AND ORDER?: CRISIS IN THE NINETIES 265-73 (Pluto Press 1993) (1984); Donald
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to mention those generally concerned with the lessons of American
legal realism and later post-realist critical methodologies. 2 0
Ultimately, I argue that our expanding police state and culture of
criminalization are rooted in a misguided view of the criminal law-
a view that ignores the political economy and institutional dynamics
of the criminal justice system and instead imagines a space of moral
clarity and emotional vindication where guilt and innocence exist
independently of legislative compromise and where criminality
exists independent of state, politics, or law.
This essay will proceed in three Parts. The first Part will outline
what I mean by "naturalizing" criminal law and how it may serve as
a useful frame through which to consider this book's underlying
theme. Situating this project within a broader criminological
discourse as well as a broader critical treatment of the "natural,"
this Part will examine how the image of a naturalized criminal
justice system pervades mass culture, how it underpins legal rules
and law-making, and how it has come to shape our basic legal
institutions.
The second Part will address the potential costs of the
naturalizing move. Exploring this phenomenon is not purely a
rhetorical exercise; the stakes of an inquiry into the social
preoccupation with the "natural" are all too real. This Part will
examine how this method of framing questions of criminal policy
and institutional design have helped to create not only an
unsustainable, carceral state, but also an increasingly schizophrenic
relationship to law and legality, to the police, and to the state.
Finally, this article will conclude by suggesting the potential
benefits that might be achieved by rejecting the reductive and
dangerous yet (often) intuitive or appealing view of the
"naturalized" criminal law. In closing in this way, I hope to offer at
least a glimpse of the potential normative or prescriptive payoffs of
a de-naturalizing project. I also offer a warning that is the
Braman et al., Some Realism About Punishment Naturalism, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1531, 1551-
55 (2010); Louk H.C. Hulsman, Critical Criminology and the Concept of Crime, 10 CONTEMP.
CRISES 63, 63 (1986).
20 See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF "SEX"
128-29 (1993); MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN
THE AGE OF REASON 59-60 (Richard Howard trans., 1965); Christine Desan, The Market as a
Matter of Money: Denaturalizing Economic Currency in American Constitutional History, 30
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1, 10-11, 42-43 (2005); Janet Halley, Behind the Law of Marriage (I):
From Status/Contract to the Marriage System, 6 UNBOUND: HARv. J. LEGAL LEFT 1, 46-49
(2010) (noting that "legal realism makes a distinction between law on the books and law in
action"); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685, 1721-22, 1731-33 (1976).
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necessary refrain of this descriptive work in the context of this book:
in addressing real and pressing concerns about public safety, we
must not lose sight of the unintended consequences of would-be
reforms and of the consequences of uncritically embracing criminal
law as a tool of social structuring. We must be willing to address
honestly the assumptions that underlie societal decisions about
what to criminalize and whom to incarcerate.
II. NATURAL JUSTICE, NATURAL ASSUMPTIONS
If the project at hand is to de-naturalize criminal law in order to
challenge the premise of a reform movement to stop the guilty from
going free, the first question we must ask is: how is criminal law
currently naturalized?
A. Imagining the Criminal Justice System
In popular discourse, as well as in the realm of legal argument,
criminal law is commonly tied to the language of morality.21 That
is, the imagined space of criminal law is one of sharply-delineated
moral binaries. Where other doctrinal areas may be more easily
suited to economic analysis or to other normative metrics, the
discursive realm of criminal law is one that draws stark contrasts
between good guys and bad guys, cops and robbers, the forces of
civilized society and those threatening to undermine its very
existence. 22
Indeed, in the United States, the "State," the "People," or even the
"United States" stand opposite a criminal defendant. Former
federal prosecutor turned law professor and critic of the criminal
justice system, Paul Butler, describes his own experience at the
defendant's table:
it's how all federal criminal cases are styled: the U.S. against
the defendant. It's just that I never before had a reason to
ponder how bizarre it sounds-you know, the most powerful
nation in the history of the world against you. I think I could
handle Rhode Island or North Dakota, maybe even the
District of Columbia versus Paul, but the frigging United
21 See Benjamin Levin, American Gangsters: RICO, Criminal Syndicates, and Conspiracy
Law as Market Control, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 155 (2013) (collecting sources).
22 See, e.g., JEANINE PIRRO & CATHERINE WHITNEY, To PUNISH AND PROTECT: AGAINST A
SYSTEM THAT CODDLES CRIMINALS 1 (2003) ("The office of district attorney is a battleground
where the fight between good and evil unfolds each day.").
1782 [Vol. 76.3
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States of America! I felt a little overpowered. 23
The criminal prosecution represents--or at least purports to
represent-the fulfillment of collective self-defense. 24 Through its
framing, the criminal prosecution embodies public hostility,
condemnation, and fear by performing the confrontation of polity
versus the deviant, the society versus the menace. 25
Turn on the television on any given evening, and alongside "true
crime" accounts of rampant, horrendous, and under-punished
criminality, you are likely to find fictional portrayals of sociopaths
who must be brought to justice by dedicated public servants and
victims who must be avenged through the proper systemic
mechanisms. 26 The threat of crime and the need to respond to it
swiftly and effectively is a constant refrain. 27 It is not just that we
are surrounded by a political culture that has absorbed the criminal
philosophy of Goldwater, 28 a philosophy focused on a concern that
an omnipresent and unambiguously evil criminal class threatens
law-abiding Americans and the values that they hold dear,29 it is
also that we are surrounded by a mass culture that has absorbed
the overwrought absolutism of embattled prosecutor-turned cable
22 PAUL BUTLER, LET'S GET FREE: A HIP-Hop THEORY OF JUSTICE 11-12 (2009).
24 See id. at 4, 11-15.
25 Butler accurately describes the state-sanctioned form of retribution embodied by
criminal law as "legal hate." Id. at 4.
26 See generally Ahmed A. White, Victims' Rights, Rule of Law, and the Threat to Liberal
Jurisprudence, 87 KY. L.J. 357, 358-63 (1999).
27 See SIMON, supra note 4, at 75-78 (discussing the prevalence of crime control
throughout contemporary civil society).
28 See generally FLAMM, supra note 4, at 31-37 (explaining that Goldwater advocated for
the federal government to be more involved in the fight against disorder and violence-
promoting a society of law and order); Michael A. Simons, Sense and Sentencing: Our
Imprisonment Epidemic, 25 J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 153, 158 (2010) (citing TED GEST, CRIME &
POLITICS: BIG GOVERNMENT'S ERRATIC CAMPAIGN FOR LAW AND ORDER 1 (2001)) ("In 1964, in
the face of rising crime rates, presidential candidate Barry Goldwater made being 'tough on
crime' a national issue. Although Goldwater did not win the election, his campaign tactic
changed the politics of crime on the national stage."); Vesla M. Weaver, Frontlash: Race and
the Development of Punitive Crime Policy, 21 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 230, 243 (2007) (quoting
Barry Goldwater, Peace Through Strength (Sept. 3, 1964), in 30 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY
746 (1964)) ("Crime grows faster than population, while those who break the law are accorded
more consideration than those who try to enforce the law . . . . Our wives, all women, feel
unsafe on our streets.").
29 1 use the phrase "criminal class" here advisedly and mean to imply a broader group of
individuals who do not share accepted social norms or who do not behave within the
boundaries of dominant social mores, rather than a group defined by their socioeconomic
status (although there certainly may be troubling overlaps between the two concepts). See
generally Loic WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL
INSECURITY 3-6 (2009) (explaining societal views of a broader class of delinquents-the
"castaway categories"-including such individuals as the homeless, beggars, drug addicts,
immigrants, and the unemployed).
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television personality Nancy Grace. 30
Indeed, in the past several decades, some of the nation's most
memorable and most publicized trials have been criminal trials
after which a large portion of the public believes that a guilty
defendant went free. The murder trial of O.J. Simpson, for
example, attracted almost unprecedented media coverage and
massive, emotionally-charged public responses. 31  Many were
adamant that Simpson was guilty and that he had "gotten off'
because of "technicalities" or because of mistaken racial
sympathies. 32  Similarly, the trial of Casey Anthony elicited
tremendous public response,33 much reflecting the opinion that
Anthony had "gotten away with murder" and that the workings of
the legal system had interfered with justice being done. 34
30 See generally NANCY GRACE & DIANE CLEHANE, OBJECTION!: How HIGH-PRICED
DEFENSE ATTORNEYS, CELEBRITY DEFENDANTS, AND A 24/7 MEDIA HAVE HIJACKED OUR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 302-11 (2005).
31 31 See generally ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, REASONABLE DOUBTS: THE O.J. SIMPSON CASE
AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 19-27 (1996) (discussing how the Los Angeles County
District Attorney's Office and the Los Angeles Police Department fed the media information
that tended to link O.J. Simpson to the murder); MICHAEL KNox & MIKE WALKER, THE
PRIVATE DIARY OF AN O.J. JUROR: BEHIND THE SCENES OF THE TRIAL OF THE CENTURY 252-68
(1995); Toni Morrison, The Official Story: Dead Man Golfing, in BIRTH OF A NATION'HOOD:
GAZE, SCRIPT, AND SPECTACLE IN THE O.J. SIMPSON CASE, at xiii-xxii (Toni Morrison &
Claudia Brodsky Lacour eds., 1997) (arguing that the media depicted O.J. Simpson as guilty
from the start with absolutely no chance of innocence); Nicholas A. Battaglia, Comment, The
Casey Anthony Trial and Wrongful Exonerations: How "Trial By Media" Cases Diminish
Public Confidence in the Criminal Justice System, 75 ALB. L. REV. 1579, 1585 (2012) ("[T]he
Supreme Court has acknowledged the interplay of the media in litigation and essentially the
notion of a 'trial by media'. . . .").
32 See, e.g., United States v. Lentz, 58 F. App'x 961, 966 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal citation
omitted) ("[T]he O.J. Simpson case has become a short hand way to describe tragic domestic
violence and the inflammatory inference of getting away with murder."); Richard L. Lippke,
Modifying Double Jeopardy, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 511, 534 (2012) (arguing that the criminal
justice system is called into doubt by the public when it appears as though the guilty have
been set free).
33 See generally Battaglia, supra note 31, at 1586 (quoting John Cloud, How the Casey
Anthony Murder Case Became the Social-Media Trial of the Century, TIME, June 16, 2011,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2077969-1,00.html) (describing the Casey
Anthony case "as the 'social media trial of the century"'); Amy Pavuk & Bianca Prieto, Casey
Anthony Not Guilty of Murder, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 5, 2011,
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2011-07-05/news/os-casey-anthony-verdict-
20110704_ 1_george-and-cindy-anthony-jose-baez-hopespring-drive (illustrating the crowds
that swarmed the courthouse as the verdict was read).
34 See, e.g., Mikaela Conley, Public Irate Over Casey Anthony Verdict; Social Media Sites
Explode With Opinions, ABC NEWS (July 5, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/casey-
anthony-verdict-outrage-spills-online/story?id=14002257#.TrNa0HKLWk8 ("In New York's
Times Square, a woman reacted tearfully to the trial's verdict: 'She killed a little girl. So she
gets off and, you know, and she goes home and maybe has another baby that she can abuse
and hurt."'). But cf. Alan M. Dershowitz, Editorial, Casey Anthony: The System Worked,
WALL ST. J., July 7, 2011, at Al5 ("[The evidence in this case left a reasonable doubt in the
mind of all of the jurors. The system worked."); Thomas L. Knapp, Casey Anthony and
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In the narrative that flows through the semi-permeable
membrane between true-crime programming and fictional police
dramas, the moral binary between law enforcement and criminal
offender is clear, and the need to impose "swift justice" and protect
vulnerable members of society is unmistakable and non-
negotiable.35 Prosecutors are often portrayed negatively for being
overly concerned with legal niceties like burdens of proof and
sufficiency of evidence. 36 The heroic detective, officer, or attorney
knows guilt when she sees it. Indeed, to a certain extent, this
naturalization of guilt and emphasis on unambiguous moral
binaries may be most notable in an extreme and almost
unrecognizable form in the rise of the fictional profiler or the
protagonist with an ability to think like or understand the way the
perpetrator operates-the criminal is often rendered as other, not
just in her moral transgressions but in her thought processes and
neuroses, and the law enforcement community can employ a quasi-
mystical, quasi-scientific model to pick out the criminal.37
Interestingly, this naturalization and unambiguous portrayal of
the law's enforcers is often not terribly noticeable in large part
because of the extreme images of criminality that serve as their
counterpoints. From Criminal Minds, where members of the FBI's
"Behavioral Analysis Unit" use some blend of science and
pseudoscience to construct profiles of sociopathic serial killers, 38 to
Law and Order: Special Victims Unit, where hard-boiled detectives
face-off against depraved rapists and sexual predators, the lines are
American Justice, COUNTERPUNCH (July 7, 2011),
http://www.counterpunch.org/2011/07/07/casey-anthony-and-american-justice ("The Casey
Anthony verdict is a faint candle flame in a growing darkness-the darkness of political
government, an institution fit only for the eradication of freedom's light."); Jeffrey Scott
Shapiro, Op-Ed., Casey Anthony Verdict a Victory for the Constitution, Fox NEWS (July 5,
2011), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2011/07/05/casey-anthony-verdict-victory-for-
constitution ("What many people often think is the product of a flawed justice system that
allows the guilty to walk free is actually the finest example of our judicial process and the
constitutional framework that designed it.").
35 See generally GRACE & CLEHANE, supra note 30, at 1-5 (arguing that the Constitution
protects the accused, yet victims have no recourse unless individuals like Grace fight for
them); PIRRO & WHITNEY, supra note 22, at 1-4 ("My ideas and action involve giving a public
voice to victims who cannot for themselves . . . . Punish[ment] and [p]rotect[ion] is about
them, not about me.").
36 See Battaglia, supra note 31, at 1597-98 (discussing public perceptions of prosecutors in
situations like the Casey Anthony trial where the accused potentially go free because of
"procedural loopholes" as well as "extraordinarily high prosecutorial burdens of proof").
31 See, e.g., Criminal Minds (CBS television broadcast 2005-present) (depicting an "elite
team of FBI profilers who analyze the country's most twisted criminal minds, anticipating




generally clear, because the criminals are the worst of the worst. 39
That is, the criminal in these spaces is deranged, sadistic, and
menacing. She-or, usually, he-stands as a clear risk to public
safety, societal well-being, and decency. Even in renderings where
the identity of the guilty party is uncertain, or where authorities
originally err in identifying the perpetrator, the act that the
criminal committed-senseless killing, child molestation, torture-
is clearly abhorrent and unforgivable.
Such emphasis on the clearly criminal, the viciously sociopathic,
focuses our attention on the extreme-the unnaturally cunning
serial killer, the bloodthirsty sadist, or the child predator- and by
doing so deflects attention from the fact that the criminal justice
system is not designed (or at least should not be designed) with
these extreme examples as the paradigm of criminality. Put
another way, people break the law with great frequency, and these
transgressions vary tremendously in severity. We could certainly
imagine a society in which all crimes were viewed as equally
inexcusable and greeted with the same punishment. But this is not
how the U.S. criminal justice system-a system that gradates
crimes based on culpable states of mind, on ages of victims, or on
past criminal activities-is structured.40 The central question, then,
that I ask is how this fascination with cases of absolute and certain
moral guilt, of clear blacks and whites, affect the institutional
design and legal framework of a system that addresses many
shades of gray?41
39 See generally Law & Order: Special Victims Unit (NBC television broadcast 1999-
present), available at http://www.nbc.com/law-and-order-special-victims-unit/about ("This
hard-hitting and emotional series . . . [depicts] the New York City Police Department, an
elite squad of detectives . .. investigat[ing] sexually based crimes.").
40 Doris Layton MacKenzie, Criminal Justice and Crime Prevention, NAT'L CRIM. JUST.
REFERENCE SERVICE (2013), https://www.ncjrs.gov/works/chapter9.htm (explaining that age,
gender, and criminal conduct are factors considered in determining criminal activity).
41 An easy response to my focus on the extremity of these criminal narratives is to say that
the serial killer, the sexual deviant, or the unambiguous outlaw is much more interesting
than the petty thief, the regulatory offender, or the minor offender. There is certainly some
truth in this critique: ultimately, mass culture is an industry, and it is not difficult to believe
that these titillating and shocking stories are more marketable and readily consumable than
stories of low-level offenders. Even if this critique were entirely accurate, however, it would
not detract from my argument, given that my point is not why we tell these stories or find
them so captivating, but rather that these are the stories that we as a society are told (and
tell ourselves). That is, even if the reason that a minute, extreme class of crimes receive the
bulk of media attention is obvious and is entirely dependent upon ratings and market share
analysis, the fact that we-as a culture of viewers and consumers-are bombarded by these
narratives and are able to identify easily these stories as the tales of true crime in our society,
is ultimately significant, I argue, to the way that we as a society structure our decisions about
criminal law and the criminal justice system. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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In this discursive space, moral disapprobation is not reserved
solely for the criminal defendants. We also see criminal defense
attorneys treated as somehow complicit in criminality and standing
between their clients and justice.42 Defendants are often presumed
guilty (because-as in the case of Anthony and Simpson-we know
that they did it43), and the attorneys often appear unconcerned with
protecting the boundless universe of viewers from the malevolence
of their clients. Victim's rights advocate Wendy Murphy, a vocal
proponent of this naturalized view of the criminal law, describes
perversion of criminal justice by immoral attorneys and a system
that coddles criminals:
we can see the unbelievable shenanigans as criminals get
away with murder, while the rest of us-if I can speak for
the rest of us-get indigestion watching one smug thug after
another walk away from his crimes scot-free. I bet you can
conjure up such an image: a man who should be in prison
boasting about his victory on the courthouse steps, crowing
into the microphones and TV cameras with a smirking
lawyer by his side.44
There are criminals; then there are "the rest of us," a law-abiding
community which is properly outraged by criminals and the legal
"shenanigans" that allow them to roam the streets. 45
The current depiction of the legal system, therefore, can be seen
to reflect a peculiar attitude about the distinction between an
adversarial and an inquisitorial system. That is, while past
fictional and journalistic accounts of trials often celebrated the clash
of attorneys, 46 contemporary criminal narratives appear to harbor a
deep resentment towards the presence of the defense attorney and
the systemic counterweight that she represents.47 The ideal of a
criminal proceeding that emerges from the various Law and Order
42 As noted, supra note 36 and accompanying text, prosecutors who demonstrate restraint
or unwillingness to pursue charges on hunches instead of concrete evidence often face a
similarly negative treatment, but generally appear to be identified more with obstructionism
or perhaps punctiliousness rather than the criminality or amorality/immorality ascribed to
defense attorneys.
43 David Epps, Casey Anthony and O.J. Simpson, CITIZEN (July 8, 2011, 12:28 PM),
http://www.thecitizen.com/blogs/david-epps/07-08-2011/casey-anthony-and-oj-simpson.
44 WENDY MURPHY, AND JUSTICE FOR SOME: AN EXPost OF THE LAWYERS AND JUDGES
WHO LET DANGEROUS CRIMINALS Go FREE 3 (2007).
4 See id.
46 See ESTRICH, supra note 4, at 107 (describing a shift in the way attorneys practice law).
But see WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 73 (2011).
4 See, e.g., ESTRICH, supra note 4, at 94-95, 110-11; GRACE & CLEHANE, supra note 30, at
5.
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franchises and their ilk is the grand jury-the space in which the
government gets to make its case, without any critical or
confrontational voice in opposition.
Murphy, like other commentators who contend that great
injustices are done by corrupt defense attorneys who prevent society
from punishing offenders, is careful to emphasize that she does not
believe that all defense attorneys are immoral or that there is
something inherently wrong with defending those accused of
crimes. 48 "[A]ttorneys who represent disgusting human beings [but]
play by the rules," Murphy contends, "deserve our utmost respect." 49
The problem is not that we are being confronted with a popular
reaction against "cheating" defense attorneys; the problem is that
there is no meaningful distinction being made between cheating and
defending. Certainly, questions of legal ethics, of the social
desirability of suppressing confessions or evidence, and of the way
to balance the duties to client, the court, and the public are
legitimate and difficult ones. But if we call the legitimate exercise
of procedural protections and behavior within proscribed
professional norms "cheating" that may result in the guilty going
free, then whose job is it to protect the rights of the criminal
defendant? Are we veering too close to eliding the identity of the
criminal defendant with that of the criminal? And, finally, what of
the criminal defendant who is not guilty or who is not a "disgusting
person"?
This is not to say that there is a monolithic treatment of criminal
law and criminality in mass culture. Indeed, other powerful
counter-narratives or alternative narratives embrace a more
ambiguous view of the line between law and lawlessness, glamorize
the outlaw, or expose the social, economic, and political causes of
criminal behavior.50  But it is important to acknowledge the
prevalence of the rhetorical space in which criminality is treated in
the absolute because, I argue, it is this trope that helps shape the
cultural fear that the guilty may go free and that the hyper-
technical space of the "legal" and of procedural protection may fail
to maintain public safety and perform the acts of public retribution
48 See ESTRICH, supra note 4, at 94-95, 110-11; see also MURPHY, supra note 44, at 3-4.
4 MURPHY, supra note 44, at 3-4. This is a repeated refrain in Murphy's writing. "Let's
get one thing on the table right away. There's nothing wrong with zealous advocacy for
accused criminals. Public relations people are paid to spin, and lawyers are paid to advocate."
Id. at 27.
5 See, e.g., BUTLER, supra note 20, at 138-40; Donald F. Tibbs, From Black Power to Hip
Hop: Discussing Race, Policing, and the Fourth Amendment Through the "War on" Paradigm,
15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 47, 73-79 (2012).
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that society appears to be demanding.
B. Fitting Law to Rhetoric
There is much more to be said about the cultural framing of
criminal law and criminal procedure, but in order to situate my
ultimate argument about the significance of de-naturalizing, I move
now to the concrete ways in which naturalization plays out in courts
across the United States and in the doctrinal evolution of criminal
law. Without tracing a direct causal link, this article proceeds on
the assumption that there is indeed an important relationship
between formal legal discourse and lawmaking on the one hand,
and unofficial, cultural discourse on the other.51  While this
relationship is one that has certainly been explored elsewhere, 52 it
appears particularly resonant in the criminal realm for several
reasons.
First, as discussed at the outset of this essay, criminal law has
frequently been an important election issue,53 meaning that public
discourse has a clear point of interaction with official
policymaking.54 Indeed, unlike many legal areas that appear
51 See David A. Harris, The Appearance of Justice: Court TV, Conventional Television, and
Public Understanding of the Criminal Justice System, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 785, 786, 796 (1993);
see also Angelique M. Paul, Turning the Camera on Court TV- Does Televising Trials Teach
Us Anything About the Real Law?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 655, 655-56 (1997).
52 See, e.g., JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 67-69
(1983); GARY MINDA, BOYCOTT IN AMERICA: How IMAGINATION AND IDEOLOGY SHAPE THE
LEGAL MIND 213-14 (1999); RICHARD D. PARKER, "HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE": A
CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST MANIFESTO 3-5 (1994); Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal
Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 60-61, 107-11 (1984); Bernard E. Harcourt, On the American
Paradox of Laissez Faire and Mass Incarceration, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 54, 54 (2012)
("[B]rilliant and well-regarded thinkers have proposed a range of theories and methods to
emancipate us from these figments of our imagination. They have offered genealogies and
archaeologies, psychoanalysis, Ideologiekritik, poststructuralism, and deconstruction-to
name but a few. Their writings are often obscure and laden with a jargon that has gotten in
the way of their keen insights, but their central point continues to resonate loudly today: our
collective imagination has real effects on our social condition and on our politics."); Benjamin
Levin, Blue-Collar Crime: Conspiracy, Organized Labor, and the Anti-Union Civil RICO
Claim, 75 ALB. L. REV. 559, 567-72 (2012).
53 JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE'S COURTS: PURSUING JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA 177-80, 235, 252 (2012).
14 Certainly, this observation is not unique to criminal law, and the public conversations
that shape electoral politics frequently deal with issues that relate to the courts and the
drafting of statutes. Not to exceptionalize, but in the criminal context, these political debates
seem more compelling than in other contexts. That is, where most policy debates have clear
legal implications and necessarily involve some discussion of "law reform," the debates about
criminal justice are more often explicitly grounded in conversations about specific statutory
alterations and court decisions. See, e.g., Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA
L. REV. 741, 791-93 (2007) (describing the discourse and legal aims of feminist law reformers
who had joined forces with the victim's rights movement).
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daunting to those without legal training or a substantial,
specialized vocabulary, criminal law appears more easily accessible
and more relatable.55
Second, the jury, an essential component of the criminal justice
system, is a representation of public values and community norms.56
The "reasonable man"-that amorphous and clearly fictional
benchmark of morality and community values-is a linchpin for
criminal law in the United States, 7 and jurors, as those "reasonable
men," occupy a critical and highly privileged position in a criminal
trial. Reading criminal law doctrine and evolutions in criminal law
policy against the backdrop of cultural narratives and popular
representations of the criminal justice system, therefore, becomes
an important component of a project that encourages the re-
examination of how we conceptualize the criminal justice system.
In the legislative arena, the pre-occupation with increasingly
harsh criminal statutes has yielded, inter alia, "three strikes"
sentencing mechanisms that target some broader criminal class,58
mandatory minimum sentences that eliminate the possibility of
judicial mercy,59 and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") that significantly hampers the ability of
prisoners to obtain federal review of their state court convictions.60
65 Even without delving into the cultural narrative examined in the previous Part, it
hardly seems a reach to suggest that the quintessential image of the trial in popular culture
is derived much more from Perry Mason or Twelve Angry Men than from the imagined space
of securities litigation.
5* See Phoebe A. Haddon, Rethinking the Jury, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 29, 31-32
(1994).
57 See generally ESTRICH, supra note 4, at 13 (explaining how the law is often defined by
what a reasonable person would do); CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN:
PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM 3-4 (2003) (describing the purpose of the
reasonable man standard).
** See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 17-18, 30-31 (2003) (upholding a three-
strikes sentence of life incarceration for the theft of three golf clubs); see WESTERN, supra note
14, at 50; Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Do Three Strikes Laws Make Sense? Habitual
Offender Statutes and Criminal Incapacitation, 87 GEO. L.J. 103, 103 (1998); Ahmed A.
White, The Juridical Structure of Habitual Offender Laws and the Jurisprudence of
Authoritarian Social Control, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 705, 705 (2006).
as See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Tempering or Tampering? Mercy and the Administration of
Criminal Justice, in FORGIVENESS, MERCY, AND CLEMENCY 19 (Austin Sarat & Nasser
Hussain eds., 2007); Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Cruel and Unusual Federal
Punishments, 98 IOWA L. REV. 69, 72 (2012).
60 See, e.g., Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Bobby v. Dixon,
132 S. Ct. 26, 27 (2011) (per curiam); Bobby v. Mitts, 131 S. Ct. 1762, 1765 (2011) (per
curiam); Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1410 (2011); Felkner v. Jackson, 131 S. Ct.
1305, 1307 (2011) (per curiam); Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 745 (2011); Harrington v.
Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 787 (2011); Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1860 (2010); Berghuis v.
Smith, 130 S. Ct. 1382, 1395, 1397 (2010); Thayler v. Haynes, 130 S. Ct. 1171, 1172 (2010)
(per curiam); Smith v. Spisak, 130 S. Ct. 676, 680 (2010)) ("In 2010-11 alone, the Supreme
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This statutory framework, in many ways, operates as a check on the
perceived "judicial activism" of the Warren Court that might insert
judges as a mitigating voice in the public's war on crime.61 That is,
under many of these statutes, legislators--often in blatant efforts to
appeal to popular narratives about the need to check otherwise
unrestrained criminality-eliminate discretion or clemency from the
workings of the criminal justice system. 62
Meanwhile, on the judicial front, the expansive procedural
protections of the Warren Court have seen substantial narrowing in
recent decades.63 Miranda has been carved away as courts defer to
the "expertise" of police officers.64 Similarly, in the realm of civil
checks on the criminal justice system, courts have displayed marked
hostility to civil rights suits that seek to compensate individuals
who have been wronged by official actors. Bivens actions65 are all
but moribund,66 while claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 face increasing
Court has reversed circuit appellate courts in ten decisions for not adhering to AEDPA's
requirements."); David Rubenstein, Comment, AEDPA's Ratchet: Invoking the Miranda Right
to Counsel After the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 86 WASH. L. REV. 905,
925-26 (2011); Jordan Steiker, Restructuring Post-Conviction Review of Federal
Constitutional Claims Raised by State Prisoners: Confronting the New Face of Excessive
Proceduralism, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 315, 327.
61 See Chris Gaspard, Note, Kimbrough and Gall: Taking Another "Crack" at Expanding
Judicial Discretion Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 757, 758-59
(2009).
62 See, e.g., STUNTZ, supra note 46, at 10, 73, 295; Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing
Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105 CoLUM. L. REV. 1010,
1027-42 (2005).
63 See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (holding that there is no
legitimate expectation of privacy for Fourth Amendment purposes as to phone numbers
dialed); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976) (holding that there is no legitimate
expectation of privacy in bank records); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 (1976) (holding
that Fourth Amendment issues are not cognizable in federal habeas corpus petitions when
state has provided full and fair opportunity to litigate claims); see also Cornell W. Clayton &
J. Mitchell Pickerill, The Politics of Criminal Justice: How the New Right Regime Shaped the
Rehnquist Court's Criminal Justice Jurisprudence, 94 GEO. L.J. 1385, 1402 (2006); Stephen F.
Smith, The Rehnquist Court and Criminal Procedure, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1337, 1358 (2002)
("Instead of overruling Warren Court precedents it deemed to be erroneous, the Rehnquist
Court has distinguished, created exceptions to, and reinterpreted such precedents . . . .
Whatever else might be said about the Court's approach, it was highly effective in producing
the 'law and order' results Nixon and Reagan promised to deliver.").
64 See, e.g., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2262 (2010); Barry Friedman, The
Wages of Stealth Overruling (With Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1,
16-25 (2010) (reviewing Supreme Court precedents "gradually overruling" Miranda).
65 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
389, 394-97 (1971).
66 See, e.g., Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 620, 626 (2012); Hui v. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct.
1845, 1851, 1855 (2010) (holding that Bivens actions are barred in situations where Congress
explicitly states that the Federal Tort Claims Act "shall be exclusive of any other civil action
or proceeding by reason of the same subject-matter against the officer or employee"); Corr.
Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Bivens is a relic of the
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obstacles.67 The doctrine of qualified immunity has grown to protect
the actions of police officers,68 while absolute immunity shields the
over-zealous or unethical prosecutor.69
The rhetoric of opinions both in the criminal realm and in the
context of federal civil rights cases arising from plaintiffs'
interactions with the criminal justice system have come to
emphasize extreme deference for the knowledge and expertise of
law enforcement officers. 70 That is, in analyzing questions of
probable cause, reasonable suspicion, and use of force, courts tend
to rely on deferential standards that take as a starting point, an
assumption that law enforcement officers possess expertise and act
reasonably.71
heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action-
decreeing them to be 'implied' by the mere existence of a statutory or constitutional
prohibition."); T. Ward Frampton, Comment, Bivens's Revisions: Constitutional Torts After
Minneci v. Pollard, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1711, 1717 (2012).
67 See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Shoe-Horning, Shell Games, and Enforcing Constitutional
Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 78 UMKC L. REV. 875, 885 & n.69 (2010).
68 See, e.g., Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1241, 1250 (2012); Susan Bendlin,
Qualified Immunity: Protecting "All But the Plainly Incompetent" (And Maybe Some of Them,
Too), 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1023, 1026-27 (2012); A. Allise Burris, Note, Qualifying
Immunity in Section 1983 & Bivens Actions, 71 TEX. L. REV. 123, 163 (1992) (citing Kit
Kinports, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered Questions, 23 GA. L.
REV. 597, 614-15 (1989); David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme
Court: Judicial Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23,
65, 80 (1989)) ("Harlow's concern for eliminating inquiries into malice may shield even those
who knowingly violate the law.").
69 See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1355-56, 1366 (2011); Van de Kamp v.
Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 338-39, 346 (2009).
70 See generally Josh Segal, Note, 'All of the Mysticism of Police Expertise": Legalizing
Stop-and-Frisk in New York, 1961-1968, 47 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 573, 577-78 (2012)
(explaining how the courts will generally heed and give deference to the expertise of law
enforcement officers, gained through their training and experience).
71 See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481
F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973) ("'Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem
unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers,' violates the Fourth Amendment."); United
States v. Chavez, 660 F.3d 1215, 1221-1222 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v.
McHugh, 639 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (2011)) ("Although 'reasonable suspicion requires [an]
officer to act on something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch,
the level of suspicion required . . . is considerably less than proof by a preponderance of the
evidence or that required for probable cause.' In determining whether reasonable suspicion
exists, 'we look to the totality of the circumstances, rather than assessing each factor or piece
of evidence in isolation.' In so doing, we 'defer to the ability of . .. trained law enforcement
officer[s] to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions."'); United States v. Dunbar,
553 F.3d 48, 55 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Ruidiaz, 529 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir.
2008) ("This inquiry into reasonableness 'requires a reviewing court to consider the totality of
the surrounding circumstances' and make a 'commonsense determination' that entails some
deference to the perceptions of experienced officers."); Burchett v. Kiefer, 310 F.3d 937, 944
(6th Cir. 2002) (stating that the analysis of use of reasonable force by a police officer "contains
a built-in measure of deference to the officer's on-the-spot judgment about the level of force
necessary in light of the circumstances"); United States v. Zubia-Melendez, 263 F.3d 1155,
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This account is of course cursory, and there may well be practical
reasons suggesting that it might not be a normative good for courts
to spend more time and effort closely monitoring the behavior of
police officers and prosecutors; nevertheless, this doctrinal evolution
represents a clear shift in the balance of power. Discretion has not
been removed from the criminal justice system; rather it-and the
locus of power-has been shifted from the courts to law enforcement
officers and prosecutors. Perhaps this has some appeal from a
populist perspective-many judges are not elected,72 though many
prosecutorS73 and sheriffS74 are. But even here, such a reading
misses the way that the system increasingly disempowers juries,
which are (at least ostensibly) the ultimate populist institution.75
With prosecutors holding more of the cards, and with more cases
shifting from trials to pleas, the polity actually has less and less
direct voice in the process.76
This shift is also an important marker of the naturalization of
criminal law: judges are supposed to be objective, favoring neither
side, and instead, representing some nebulous idealized
understanding of "The Law."77 Prosecutors and law enforcement
officers are meant to represent "the public" and are bound by
assorted professional, ethical, and legal rules, but they are also
players in an adversarial system.78 By reassigning power from
1162 (10th Cir. 2001).
72 Jack L. Landau, Some Thoughts About State Constitutional Interpretation, 115 PENN ST.
L. REV. 837, 849 (2011) (noting that federal judges in the United States are not elected).
73 Michael J. Ellis, The Origins of the Elected Prosecutor, 121 YALE L. J. 1528, 1530 & n.1
(2012) (footnote omitted) ("The United States is the only country in the world where citizens
elect prosecutors.").
74 See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. 13, § 13 ("[T]he sheriff and the clerk of each county shall be
chosen by the electors once in every three or four years as the legislature shall direct.").
75 See Nancy Gertner, Circumventing Juries, Undermining Justice: Lessons from Criminal
Trials and Sentencing, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 419, 433-34 (1999) (explaining how case law
has minimized jury contributions to the justice system).
76 See, e.g., Oren Gazal-Ayal & Avishalom Tor, The Innocence Effect, 62 DUKE L.J. 339, 341
(2012) (noting that the criminal justice system is dominated by plea bargaining, as nearly
ninety-five percent of felony defendants enter into guilty pleas).
77 See Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 742 (1982) ('The
judge . . . seeks not just a plausible interpretation, but an objectively true one. Judges may
not protect their preferences or their views of what is right or wrong, or adopt those of the
parties, or of the body politic, but rather must say what the [law] requires.").
78 See David Aaron, Ethics, Law Enforcement, and Fair Dealing: A Prosecutor's Duty to
Disclose Nonevidentiary Information, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3005, 3005 (1999) ("Legal and
ethical codes maintain a general standard of professional conduct among attorneys."); id. at
3015 (explaining that "[tihe prosecutor represents society" as a whole and it is her duty to
"protecto the due process rights of [all] individual[s]"); see also Dasha Kabakova, The Lack of
Accountability for the New York Police Department's Investigative Stops, 10 CARDOZO PUB. L.
POL'Y & ETHICS J. 539, 561 (2012) (noting that the NYPD took initiatives to ensure more
professionalism among law enforcement officers).
1794 Albany Law Review [Vol. 76.3
judges to prosecutors, then, the criminal justice system has shifted
the axis. Instead of a counterweight before the judge (and the jury),
the defendant and defense counsel become interlopers, outsiders in
a realm dominated by the prosecution.79
III. WHY DE-NATURALIZE?
"[Flaith in natural order," writes Bernard Harcourt, "forecloses a
full, normative assessment of market outcomes."80 Viewing the
market or market structures as natural, he argues:
[This] faith in natural order . .. closes the door on the very
condition of possibility. It effectively depoliticizes the
market itself and its outcomes. It is only when the illusion of
natural order is lifted that a real problem arises: that of the
justice of the organizational rules and their distributional
consequences.81
7o See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 309, 314-15, 314 n.23 (2001) (footnote omitted) (noting that the prosecutor dominates
the criminal justice system by having a "virtual monopoly [over] the fact-finding process").
80 HARCOURT, supra note 4, at 32.
8' Id.; see also Desan, supra note 20, at 7 (stating that the history of the American political
economy, and "the market," should be analyzed within a constitutional framework, rather
than by looking at it as a "natural development"); Roy Kreitner, Legal History of Money, 8
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 415, 425 (2012) (noting that economics tends to naturalize money-
which has become "an instrument [rather than] something that was made to be used"). While
presented by Harcourt through a Foucauldian lens, this argument finds roots in the strands
of American legal realism (particularly as interpreted by later scholars) that critiqued the
treatment of legal rules and exchanges in a vacuum and emphasized the political and
economic implications of treating such rules as natural, unalterable, and inviolable. See, e.g.,
Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8, 11-13 (1928) (rejecting the
idea that legal principles are neutral and noting that economics and politics must be
considered in conjunction with the laws); Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a
Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 470 (1923) ("Some sort of coercive
restriction of individuals, it is believed, is absolutely unavoidable, and cannot be made to
conform to any Spencerian formula. Since coercive restrictions are bound to affect the
distribution of income and the direction of economic activities, and are bound to affect the
economic interests of persons living in foreign parts, statesmen cannot avoid interfering with
economic matters, both in domestic and in foreign affairs. There is accordingly a need for the
development of economic and legal theory to guide them in the process."); see Hale, supra, at
493 (arguing that "[t]he 'principles of justice' supposed to govern courts do not suffice");
Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!, 15 LEGAL STUD. F. 327, 327
(1991) (suggesting "a method for analyzing the role of the law in the reproduction of social
injustice in . . . capitalist societies."). By beginning to recognize an institution not as
naturally-occurring, inevitable, or immutable, we open up discursive spaces, policymaking
spaces, and law-making spaces to broader assessments of the desirability of these ostensible
givens. See Desan, supra note 20, at 7 (advocating that understanding the market and the
American political economy as a hybrid of practices could actually result in a "hidden
constitutional world"). Background rules may cease to be treated as unchangeable and may
become the building blocks for alternate social, economic, or political relationships. See supra
Part II.
De-Naturalizing Criminal Law
A similar argument undergirds this article: when we treat as
natural assumptions about guilt and innocence and when we
embrace a sort of "natural order" that categorizes criminals as
sociopaths and others as potential victims, that cleaves the polity
from the criminals. We similarly "close [ the door on the very
condition of possibility" and depoliticize the criminal justice system
and its outcomes.82 When we take as our starting point a society in
which criminals are "going free" due to the interference of attorneys
and judges in the workings of natural justice, we naturally silence a
range of concerns about over-criminalization and expanding
criminal punishment. We too easily forget about the trade-offs-the
checks and balances that are built into the criminal justice
system.83
This selective amnesia yields a troubling schizophrenia in the
politics and institutional design of the U.S. criminal justice system.
"While Americans vote for politicians who pass laws that make most
people criminals," observe Judge Alex Kozinski and Misha Tseytlin
in their provocatively-titled essay You're (Probably) A Federal
Criminal, Americans "also support harshly punishing and socially
ostracizing those convicted of crimes . . . [and] [i]n sum, most people
think of criminals as bad people, who deserve punishment, while
not realizing that they are criminals themselves."84
On the one hand, being perceived as "soft on crime" has become
the kiss of death for elected officials in all branches of government
and at local and national levels.85 On the other hand, however,
wide swaths of criminal behavior have become-implicitly, if not
altogether explicitly-socially accepted. Certainly, some degree of
acceptable law-breaking occurs where the penalties are limited and
the moral stigma attached to the offense is neither new or unique,
nor terribly noteworthy. "Law-abiding" citizens exceed speed limits,
82 HARCOURT, supra note 4, at 32. Harcourt's work on market de-naturalization is also
rooted in a nuanced argument about the interdependence of laissez-faire economic policies
and the expansion of the carceral state-a relationship he terms "neoliberal penality" and
which rests in many ways on the same sort of naturalist rhetoric and ideology examined in
this article. See generally id. at 37-40.
83 See Jeanne M. Kempthorne, Naked and Arbitrary Power: Judicial Judgments of
Acquittal, 48 Bos. B. J. 30, 30 (Sept./Oct. 2004) (highlighting the distribution of power that
provides balance to the criminal justice system).
84 Alex Kozinski & Misha Tseytlin, You're (Probably) A Federal Criminal, in IN THE NAME
OF JUSTICE: LEADING EXPERTS REEXAMINE THE CLASSIC ARTICLE "THE AIMS OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW" 44 (Timothy Lynch ed., 2009).
8 See generally NICOLA LACEY, THE PRISONERS' DILEMMA: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND
PUNISHMENT IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES, at xv-xvi (2008) (claiming that leniency is
seen as "politically impossible").
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commit traffic violations, and may well commit other ticketable
offenses that might not raise an eyebrow from friends, neighbors, or
prospective employers. But what about transgressions that carry
heavy criminal penalties? Massive numbers of the population,
including the last three U.S. Presidents,86 have used illegal drugs.87
Generations have come of age burning CDs and DVDs, downloading
and trading movies, and viewing copyright protections as an
inconvenience as opposed to a clear legal directive.88 At the same
time that mass cultural narratives of naturalized criminal justice
proliferate, 89 images of drug use, underage drinking, impaired
driving, and potentially criminal youthful sexual activity abound, 90
often unaccompanied by any sort of moral opprobrium. 91
Am I suggesting that we cannot distinguish between a marijuana
user and a murderer? Of course not. It would be disingenuous to
conclude that because we do not take every law seriously as a moral
directive, we cannot take any law seriously as such. Nevertheless,
the view of criminal law as unambiguous and rooted in sharp moral
binaries and designed to punish and prosecute inexcusable deviance
simply does not jibe with a social context in which criminal
behavior-behavior punishable with incarceration-is treated as
mundane:
We are used to thinking of "criminals" as a small subset of
the population," argues Ilya Somin.92 In that happy state of
86 See Drew Harwell, Obama's Drug Use Debated, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009, 3:26 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-502323_162-3823725.html (discussing the drug use of
Presidents Obama, Clinton, and Bush).
8 See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY,
DRUG POLICY INFORMATION CLEARINGHOUSE FACTSHEET: DRUG USE TRENDS 1-2 (October
2002), available at http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/20719.pdf (showing
the reported rate of drug use among the general population); Kozinski & Tseytlin, supra note
84, at 46-47 (estimating that nearly half of the adult population will try illicit drugs at some
point).
8 See, e.g., Bootie Cosgrove-Mather, Poll: Young Say File Sharing OK, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11,
2009, 8:29 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/09/18/opinion/polls/main573990.shtml
(stating that up to fifty-eight percent of Americans think that sharing music electronically is
acceptable).
89 See discussion supra Part II.A.
90 See, e.g., HAROLD & KUMAR Go TO WHITE CASTLE (New Line Cinema 2004) (telling the
story of two affluent, successful young men who drive around New Jersey and smoke a great
deal of marijuana); SUPERBAD (Columbia Pictures 2007) (portraying high school students who
drink, use fake driver's licenses, and engage in sexual activity).
9' See generally JOHANNA BLAKLEY & SHEENA NAHM, NORMAN LEAR CTR., THE PRIMETIME
WAR ON DRUGS & TERROR 8 (2011), available at
http://www.learcenter.org/pdflDrugs&Terror.pdf ("In TV storylines about the War on Drugs,
drug users are not arrested and drug suspects are often portrayed as morally ambiguous or
even heroic.').
92 Ilya Somin, If You're Reading This, You're Probably a Federal Criminal, VOLOKH
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affairs, criminal law threatens only a small number of
people, most of whom have committed genuinely heinous
acts . . . [b]ut when we are all federal criminals, perfectly
ordinary citizens can easily get swept up in the net . . . .9
This schizophrenia between the one-way ratchet of criminal law
and the expanding portion of the population that occupies liminal
spaces or is somehow connected to criminality occasionally boils
down to the surface of public consciousness. The recent death of
Aaron Swartz, the young internet activist whose federal prosecution
is believed to have precipitated his suicide, is one such powerful
example.94  Swartz, a well-known figure in the internet and
cyberlaw communities, was charged with violating the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA")95 for gaining access to the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Network and downloading
numerous academic articles. 96 Under CFAA, a statute enacted prior
to the internet's widespread usage, Swartz faced up to thirty-five
years in prison because he had "intentionally accesse[d] a computer
without authorization or exceed[ed] authorized access," and, in the
process, "obtain[ed] information from [a] protected computer."97
Criticism of the prosecutors involved and CFAA in general rained
down furiously.98 Some critics focused on the fact that Swartz faced
CONSPIRACY (July 27, 2009 12:21 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2009/07/27/if-youre-reading-
this-youre-probably-a-federal-criminal.
93 Id.
94 See Stephen L. Carter, The Overzealous Prosecution of Aaron Swartz, BLOOMBERG (Jan.
17, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-17/the-overzealous-prosecution-of-aaron-
swartz.html; Lawrence Lessig, Aaron's Law: Violating a Site's Terms of Service Should Not
Land You in Jail, ATLANTIC (Jan. 16, 2013, 4:38 PM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/01/aarons-law-violating-a-sites-terms-of-
service-should-not-land-you-in-jail/267247/.
9s See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006).
96 Lessig, supra note 94.
7 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C). Various articles have described in detail the prosecution of
Aaron Swartz. See generally James Boyle, The Prosecution of Aaron Swartz: A Reply to Orin
Kerr, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 18, 2013, 10:11 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-
boyle/prosecution-aaron-swartz -b_- 2508242.html; Carter, supra note 94; Orin Kerr, The
Criminal Charges Against Aaron Swartz (Part 1: The Law), VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 14,
2013, 2:50 AM), http://www.volokh.comI/2013/01/14/aaron-swartz-charges; Orin Kerr, The
Criminal Charges Against Aaron Swartz (Part 2: Prosecutorial Discretion), VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Jan. 16, 2013, 11:34 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/16/the-criminal-
charges-against-aaron-swartz-part-2-prosecutorial-discretion/; Lawrence Lessig, Prosecutor as
Bully, TUMBLR (Jan. 12, 2013), http://lessig.tumblr.com/post/40347463044/prosecutor-as-
bully; Tim Wu, How the Legal System Failed Aaron Swartz-And Us, NEW YORKER (Jan. 14,
2013), http://www.newyorker.com/onlinelblogs/newsdesk/2013/01/everyone-interesting-is-a-
felon.html.
98 See, e.g., Carter, supra note 94 ("The prosecution of Swartz was ridiculous."); Lessig,
supra note 94 (contending that the government's actions in prosecuting Swartz was "absurd-
especially in a world where prosecutors can't be trusted to make reasoned and proportionate
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the possibility of being branded a felon and incarcerated for decades
for breaching a contract and exceeding the terms of a user
agreement-the sort of behavior that is a quotidian part of life in
the internet age.99 That is, Swartz faced state violence and societal
condemnation for (a more extreme version) of a transgression
commonly committed by "law abiding citizens" as a part of day-to-
day web browsing. Others, however, emphasized that Swartz's
prosecution was not unusual in a world with expansive
prosecutorial discretion and public hunger for high profile
prosecutions. 100
Like the Swartz prosecution, the Innocence Movement, powered
by heart-wrenching stories of individuals forced to endure
incarceration, public condemnation, and life as convicts for crimes
that they did not commit, provides another example of public
discomfort with the realities of the criminal justice system. 0 1 In
much the same way as the stories of crime victims and their
families who have suffered terrible loss but have not experienced
some sort of satisfactory closure by witnessing retribution, the
accounts of innocent people snatched from their lives and banished
to the darkest recesses of the criminal justice system have
captivated the media's imagination. 102
What is all too easy to disregard, however, is the necessary
judgments about who should be labeled a felon and who should not" (emphasis added)).
9 See, e.g., Carter, supra note 94.
Consider: You're sitting in your office, when suddenly you remember that you forgot to
pay your Visa bill. You take a moment to log on to your bank account, and you pay the
bill. Then you go back to work. If your employer has a policy prohibiting personal use of
office computers, then you have exceeded your authorized access; since you went to your
bank website, you have obtained financial information.
Believe it or not, you're now a felon. The likelihood of prosecution might be small, but
you've still committed a crime.
Id.
00 See, e.g., David Boeri, Retired Federal Judge Joins Criticism Over Handling of Swartz
Case, WBUR (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.wbur.org/2013/01/16/gertner-criticizes-ortiz-swartz;
Boyle, supra note 97; Carter, supra note 94.
101 See generally BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS Go WRONG 5-6 (2011) (discussing that human error does occur within the
criminal justice system and more than 250 innocent people in the last thirty years have been
exonerated by post-conviction DNA testing); Jim DWYER et al., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN
JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND How TO MAKE IT RIGHT 315-16 (2003).
102 See, e.g., Jende Desmond-Harris, Meet 22 People Exonerated in 2012, ROOT (Dec. 18,
2012, 1:02 PM), http://www.theroot.com/buzz/meet-22-people-exonerated-2012 (profiling three
men, wrongfully convicted, who werelater exonerated); Rich Phillips, Man Exonerated, Freed
From Prison After 35 Years, CNN (Dec. 17, 2009, 3:36 PM),
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/12/17/florida.dna.exonerationlindex.html (describing a
man in Florida being exonerated-after having served thirty-five years, wrongly convicted of
kidnapping and raping a nine-year-old boy); THE CENTRAL PARK FIVE (Florentine Films
2012); THE THIN BLUE LINE (Miramax Films 1988).
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relationship between the naturalized view of criminal law that
takes as its concern the specter of the "guilty going free" and other
views of criminal law that use a concern for "the innocent being
convicted."103 In a political climate where prosecutors, legislators,
and perhaps even judges feel that they have a public mandate to
ensure public safety and catch criminals whatever the cost, it is
inevitable that there will be costs.
We see this occasionally in the response to youth sexuality:
whether dealing with statutory rape, "sexting," or other sexualized
behavior by minors, lawmakers tend to pass harsh laws designed to
deter or punish those who might prey on young people. 104 Yet, like
so many other spaces where the blunt instrument of criminal law is
used in an effort to shape or reform social policy, unintended
consequences abound, and those who are caught in the prosecutor
nets are not necessarily the intended targets or do not look like the
offenders whom we see on Law and Order.105 Stories of students
punished for sending risqu6 photos to one another, 106 or the high
103 It is worth noting that the Innocence Movement or concern for wrongful convictions
need not be accompanied by a particular attitude towards a natural or de-naturalized
criminal justice system. That is, this focus may actually be accompanied by the same sorts of
moral clarity and lack of ambiguity discussed above: there are clearly guilty people and
clearly not guilty ones. See Findley, supra note 1, at 1158-63. The job of the criminal justice
system is to draw clear lines between society and law breakers, but we (as a society concerned
with The Rule of Law) should be concerned about making sure that the system operates as it
should and the innocent are not subjected to state violence. On the other hand, however, this
focus on wrongful convictions may take on the form of a broader systemic critique, focused on
deeper flaws with the legal and political institutions responsible for drawing and enforcing
lines between the guilty and the innocent. See id.
104 See, e.g., Norman Arey, Teen's Sentence a Shock to Jurors, ATLANTA J. CONST., June 2,
2003, at C1 (discussing Georgia's mandatory ten-year minimum sentence without parole for
an aggravated child molestation conviction).
105 This critique finds substantial purchase in critical feminist and post-feminist literature
on the negative consequences of tough-on-crime feminism. See, e.g., JANET HALLEY, SPLIT
DECISIONS: How AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM 6, 17-22 (2006) (arguing that too
narrow a focus on different feminist theories obstructs the rightful focus on real-world
problems facing women); JEANNIE SuK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING PRIVACY 6 (2009) (showing that domestic violence
enforcement has lead to unintended consequences for female victims); Gruber, supra note 54,
at 791-92 (noting that feminist ideals have gradually become subsumed within the
conservative victims' rights movement); Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime,
84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 649-50 (2009) (arguing that because of mandatory policies, certain
women may suffer more harm as a result of prosecuting abusers); Janet Halley et al., From
the International to the Local in Feminist Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex
Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER
335 (2006) (discussing the theory of "governance feminism"); Janet Halley, Rape at Rome:
Feminist Interventions in the Criminalization of Sex-Related Violence in Positive International
Criminal Law, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (2008).
106 See, e.g., Sexting: Schools, Legislators Debate Punishments for Offenders, HUFFINGTON
POST (Feb. 9, 2011, 9:48 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/09/sexting-schools-
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school student incarcerated for child molestation after having sex
with a classmate leads to public outcry.107 "How did we get such
unjust results," critics ask, even as voters continue to elect those
who embrace the most extreme attitudes toward criminal
punishment.108
Consider also the Duke lacrosse rape case. After a black stripper
reported that she had been raped at a party hosted by affluent,
white students on the Duke University lacrosse team, the Durham,
North Carolina community erupted in calls for the aggressive
prosecution of the perpetrators.109 District Attorney Mike Nifong,
up for reelection acquiesced, aggressively pursuing indictments and
convictions, and eventually bringing charges against three Duke
lacrosse players.110 Eventually, all charges were dropped, Nifong
was disbarred for a variety of ethical infractions, and massive civil
suits were filed by the three defendants.'11 In the aftermath, media
commentators, legal scholars, and others-amidst discussion of the
racial and socioeconomic politics that underlay the casell2-focused
on the role of Nifong, concluding that this was a tragic case of a
"rush to judgment" and an out-of-control prosecutor.113
Nifong is hardly a sympathetic character in this story, but he
should be viewed (not entirely unlike the defendants) as collateral
damage in our naturalized criminal justice system's efforts to keep
legislation n_821047.html.
107 See, e.g., Rich Cimini, Dixon Making Most of Second Chance, ESPN (Nov. 22, 2011),
http://espn.go.com/new-york/nfl/story/_1id/7269043/new-york-jets-marcus-dixon-found-jail-
high-school-now-making-most-nfl-chance (recounting the story of Marcus Dixon who was
convicted under the Georgia Child Protection Act and sentenced to ten years in jail-and
noting that "[s]everal members of the jury were reportedly stunned that the sentence was so
severe").
10s See, e.g., Karin Brulliard, Approaches to Fighting Va. Gangs are Varied, WASH. POST,
Oct. 7, 2005, at BL (discussing the 2005 Virginia gubernatorial candidates' proposals for
stricter penalties for gang members, including one proposal that would expand the number of
crimes punishable by death).
109 See STUART TAYLOR JR. & KC JOHNSON, UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT: POLITICAL
CORRECTNESS AND THE SHAMEFUL INJUSTICES OF THE DUKE LACROSSE RAPE CASE 34-35, 64-
65, 87-88 (2007); DON YAEGER & MIKE PRESSLER, IT'S NOT ABOUT THE TRUTH: THE UNTOLD
STORY OF THE DUKE LACROSSE CASE AND THE LIVES IT SHATTERED 100-01 (2007); Andrew E.
Taslitz, The Incautious Media, Free Speech, and the Unfair Trial: Why Prosecutors Need More
Realistic Guidance in Dealing with the Press, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1285, 1295 (2011).
110 Susannah Meadows & Evan Thomas, What Happened at Duke?, NEWSWEEK, May 1,
2006, at 46, 48-51.
u See Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession's Failure to Discipline Unethical Prosecutors,
36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 275, 298 (2007); Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and
the Road to the Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full Open-File
Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257, 305-06 (2008).
112 See, e.g., ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR 6-7, 196 n.7, 197 nn.12 & 16 (2007).
113 Rachel Smolkin, Justice Delayed, AM. J. REV., Aug.-Sept. 2007, at 20.
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the guilty from going free. If we were to take the easy way out, we
could embrace Murphy's critique of the criminal justice system,
proclaim that the problem is the existence of lying lawyers, and call
it a day. But this approach misses the point that we live in a society
that clamors for the heads of criminal defendants, that-as
discussed supra-is steeped in a cultural and legal discourse in
which the accused are usually guilty and all that stands between us
and unspeakable evil are prosecutors and law enforcement officers
who must be allowed to act swiftly with limited encumbrances.
Nifong, in many ways, did what was asked of him. The community
called for blood, and the prosecutor-the legal representative of "the
People"-did what he could to provide vengeance. And then we
were appalled.
Nifong's fall stands as a compelling example of the schizophrenic
view of criminal law that naturalization and the "tough on crime"
fixation with the guilty going free brings with it. Criminal law
becomes a draconian space, unmitigated by concerns for mercy,
causes of criminal behavior, or even the ambiguity of guilt; yet, at
the same time, people remain shocked when they see the results of
this aggressive approach of criminal law. As retired Judge Nancy
Gertner observed in the context of the Swartz prosecution,
If the U.S. attorney is going to take credit for every
successful prosecution . . . [he] then winds up as "Bostonian
of the Year" for these prosecutions ....
[However, w]hat happens with the press [is] you don't talk
about the cases which really reflect this kind of poor
judgment. You talk only about the cases that succeed . . .
[and t]his is the example of bad judgment [by prosecutors] I
saw too often. 114
The benefits of a carceral state are appealing, but the costs
remain staggering 15 and (somehow) continue to shock many of
those who endorse the same policies that invite sloppy, over-
inclusive criminal enforcement.
By recognizing the fallacy of the naturalized model and by
embracing a more nuanced view of the criminal justice system (a
114 Boeri, supra note 100 (quoting Judge Gertner) (internal quotation marks omitted).
n1 See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF COLORBLINDNESS 16-19 (2010) (arguing that mass incarceration actually creates a new
caste system, perpetuating racism and continued struggle for African Americans); HARVEY
SILVERGLATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY: HOW THE FEDS TARGET THE INNOCENT, at xxxi, xlv-
xlvi (2011) (describing increasing prosecution of behavior generally viewed as commonplace).
2012/2013] 1801
1802 Albany Law Review [Vol. 76.3
view that has allowed for so much of the scholarship that defines
the field of criminology)," 6 we might enter a more productive
political and legal discourse that is more honest about and open to
assessments "of the justice of the organizational rules and their
distributional consequences."" 7 Of course there are politics at play
in the crafting and application of criminal law, but perhaps we
would gain something by treating it honestly," 8 by acknowledging
that it can be a space of nuance and differing opinions instead of
embracing the false clarity that has led to an almost limitless
culture of criminalization and incarceration." 9
As a practical matter, there is no necessary normative outcome of
a denaturalizing move. Just because we honestly address the
ambiguities in the criminal law, acknowledge that police do not
have oracular power, and discuss the costs and benefits of the
carceral turn does not mean that a more lenient result will ensue.
Critical Legal Studies and Chicago-School law and economics were
both arguably descendants of American Legal Realism and its de-
naturalizing moves, yet the two legal philosophies embraced
entirely different normative projects and used similar realist
insights to advance very different ends.120 In the same way, one
116 See, e.g., DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL
THEORY 3-10 (1990); STEVE HALL, THEORIZING CRIME & DEVIANCE: A NEW PERSPECTIVE
1 (2012) (examining a shift in the theory of criminology in Western society); DRAGAN
MILOVANOVIC, CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY AT THE EDGE: POSTMODERN PERSPECTIVES,
INTEGRATION, AND APPLICATIONS 1 (Steven A. Egger ed., 2002) (describing the "postmodern
analysis" of criminology-"a radical departure from the modernist framework and
assumptions incorporated from the Enlightenment era"); Angela Y. Davis, Race and
Criminalization: Black Americans and the Punishment Industry, in THE HOUSE THAT RACE
BUILT, at 264-78 (Wahneema Lubiano ed., 1998) (discussing the interplay between race and
criminalizationlincarceration practices and suggesting the need for reform); Phil Scraton &
Kathryn Chadwick, The Theoretical and Political Priorities of Critical Criminology, in THE
POLITICS OF CRIME CONTROL, at 181 (Kevin Stenson & David Cowell eds., 1991) ("The
criminal justice process and the rule of law assist in the management of structural
contradictions and the process of criminalization is central to such management."); Jock
Young, The Failure of Criminology: The Need for a Radical Realism, in CONFRONTING
CRIME, at 4, 25-30 (Roger Matthews & Jock Young eds., 1986) (examining mainstream
criminology and noting a need for reform); Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New
Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and its Implications, 30
CRIMINOLOGY 449, 452 (1992) (explaining an emerging concept of criminology, which seeks
to "identify, classify, and manage groupings sorted by dangerousness").
117 HARCOURT, supra note 4, at 32.
116 See ESTRICH, supra note 4, at 8.
119 See, e.g., White, supra note 58, at 705 ("Habitual offender laws ... [have] bec[olme more
prominent over the last couple of decades, with almost every state, as well as the federal
government .. . adopting. . . or reinforcing [these types of laws.]").
120 Cf. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, LANGUAGE OF THE GUN: YOUTH, CRIME, AND PUBLIC POLICY
222-26 (2006) (arguing that "leaps of faith" always occur as scholars and researchers attempt
to make their data confirm their theory or ideology).
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could certainly be-and, indeed, there already are-de-naturalized
proponents of tough-on-crime policies. But even the
acknowledgment that this is a choice, that it is rooted in a broader
ideological project as opposed to being either inevitable or a
necessary component of caring about the public welfare, is of critical
importance. At least with oppositional projects, the cards are on the
table. In our naturalized criminal justice system, the hard choices
are obscured, and we are left with inevitability and un-contestable
"truths."
IV. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, this is an article about decisions and about competing
concerns. Perhaps, as William Blackstone, Voltaire, and others
have argued, it is worth risking the guilty going free so that the
innocent do not go to prison.121 Or, perhaps, public safety is such an
integral value and ensuring its existence is such an essential
function of the state that we should be willing to risk wrongful
conviction or violation of our civil liberties so that criminals are not
able to act with impunity. What I argue and what is too often
absent from the naturalized space of discussions about criminal law
and criminal justice policy is that this is, in some sense, the choice
that we are presented with. Ideally of course the guilty would
always be punished and the innocent would always go free and,
indeed, one of the goals of a book like this one may well be to try to
advance rules and reforms that get us closer to this paradigm. But
it is an unlikely outcome.
The framing of these competing views is one of the great problems
and the tremendous fallacies driving the legal and cultural
discourse on criminal law. The procedural protections of the
Warren Court, with its concerns for the rights of criminal
defendants, are treated as representing a trade-off between civil
libertarian values and the desire to punish the guilty and protect
the polity.122 Our escalating criminal policies and near-obsession
with ensuring that the guilty not go free, however, are all too rarely
121 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[I]t is far
worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free."); 4 WILLIAM BLAcKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *358 ("[B]etter that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent
suffer."); VOLTAIRE: CANDIDE & ZADIG 150 (Tobias George Smollett trans., Lester G. Crocker
ed., Washington Square Press 1962) ("[I]t is better to run the risk of sparing the guilty than
to condemn the innocent.").
122 See Smith, supra note 63, at 1358 ("Mhe Rehnquist Court has distinguished, created
exceptions to, and reinterpreted [Warren Court] precedents.").
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treated as a costly trade-off.123 Yet they are. The choice is not one
between law and order and lawlessness. The choice is between two
philosophical or ideological understandings of the roles and
obligations of the state. Until we recognize these trade-offs,
recognize that a powerful police force and lengthy prison sentences
are no more natural than the exclusionary rule,124 the Confrontation
Clause,125 or Miranda warnings, 126  we invite further
criminalization,127  greater mass incarceration,1 28  and the
proliferation of a criminal justice system that is anything but just.
123 See Findley, supra note 1, at 1208 (discussing how innocence must be defined in an
increasingly fallible legal system).
124 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
125 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
126 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
127 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505,
569 (2001) ("Legislatures' incentive to expand criminal liability has important procedural
effects: it reduces prosecutors' incentive to separate guilty defendants from innocent ones.").
128 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 12, at 12.
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